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This study contributes to the ongoing discussion on the appropriate measurement 
of overconfidence, in particular, its strictly incentive compatible measurement in 
experiments. Despite a number of significant advances in recent research, several 
important issues remain to be solved. These relate to the strictness of incentive 
compatibility, the identification of well-calibrated participants, the trichotomous 
classification into over- or underconfident and well-calibrated participants, and the 
generalization to measuring beliefs about the performance relative to other people. 
This paper develops a measurement of overconfidence that is improved regarding all 
four of these issues. We theoretically prove that our method is strictly incentive 
compatible and robust to risk attitudes within the framework of Cumulative Prospect 
Theory. Furthermore, our method allows the measurement of various levels of 
overconfidence and the direct comparison of absolute and relative confidence. We 
tested our method, and the results meet our expectations, replicate recent results, 
and show that a population can be simultaneously overconfident, well-calibrated, 
and underconfident. In our specific case, we find that more than ninety-five percent 
of the population believe to be better than twenty-five percent; about fifty percent 
believe to be better than fifty percent; and only seven percent believe to be better 
than seventy-five percent. 
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Overconfidence is a frequently observed, real-life phenomenon. Individuals exaggerate the 
precision of their knowledge, their chances for success, for being better than others, or the precision 
of  specific  types  of  information.  Although  all  these  exaggerations  are  related  to  the  term 
overconfidence (for an overview, see Griffin and Varey, 1996; Larrick et al., 2007; Moore and Healy 
2008),  in  this  paper,  we  particularly  focus  on  the  overestimation  of  own  performance  in  a 
knowledge-based  task.  This  overestimation  can  relate  to  achieving  an  objective  standard  of 
performance  or  to  be  better  than  others,  which  we  will  refer  to  as  absolute  and  relative 
overconfidence, respectively. 
Empirically,  it  has  been  shown  that  overconfidence  in  own  performance  can  affect  an 
entrepreneur's or manager's decision to enter a market (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Wu and Knott 
2006) or to invest in projects (Malmendier and Tate, 2005), a stock trader’s decision to buy specific 
stocks (Daniel et al., 1998; Stotz and Nitzsch, 2005; Cheng 2007), or an acquirer’s decision to take 
over a target firm (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). Lawyers' and applicants' probabilities of success are 
likely to depend on confidence (Compte and Postlewaite, 2004), and physicists have been shown to 
be overconfident in their choices of medical treatment (Baumann et al., 1991). Especially the last 
example illustrates that the consequences of overconfidence do not only affect the decision maker, 
but  can  also  have  significant  ramifications  for  third  parties  (e.g.,  patients,  clients,  investors, 
employees) as well as the economy and our society as a whole. 
One  stream  in  overconfidence  research  attempts  to  identify  mechanisms  that  lead  to 
overconfidence, like misestimating the difficulty of tasks based on biased experiences (Juslin and 
Olson, 1997; Soll, 1996). A further research stream studies how overconfidence affects evaluations 
of risky decision options and subsequent decisions (Simon et al., 2000; Keh et al., 2002; Cheng, 
2007). Another stream of research, in which our study is embedded, is concerned with the correct 
definition and measurement of overconfidence. In an early study, Fischhoff et al. (1977) consider 
incentives within overconfidence measurements as a potential source of measurement errors. Erev et 4 
al. (1994), Dawes and Mulford (1996), and Juslin et al. (2000) argue that measurement errors make 
it rather difficult to distinguish between ‘real’ overconfidence and ‘measured’ overconfidence, the 
latter of which may be confounded with measurement errors. 
In fact, when reporting their beliefs, individuals may not be motivated to make estimations 
that are as precise as in situations, where a significant amount of money is at stake (Fischhoff et al., 
1977).  Several  studies  therefore  incentivize  the  revelation  of  true  beliefs  by  paying  participants 
according to the precision of their judgments (Budescu et al., 1997; Moore and Healy, 2008), or by 
letting  participants  invest  into  bids  on  their  own  performance,  which  indirectly  elicits  their 
probability judgments (Moore and Kim, 2003). Cesarini et al. (2006) and Hoelzl and Rustichini 
(2005)  test  the  effect  of  monetary  incentives  and  indeed  find  significant  differences  between 
treatments in which participants are incentivized and those in which they are not. 
However, the incentive mechanisms currently available to experimentally elicit individuals’ 
overconfidence  have  their  respective  weaknesses.  First,  recently  proposed  incentive-based 
mechanisms do not elicit degrees of overconfidence, but only whether an individual or a group of 
individuals is overconfident or not (e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005; Blavatskyy, 2009). Measuring 
levels  of  overconfidence  may,  however,  be  important,  because  more  extreme  levels  of 
overconfidence  are  less  likely  to  be  affected  or  driven  by  measurement  errors.  Furthermore, 
believing to be better than average, as for instance investigated in Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005), does 
not imply overconfidence in being the best or one of the top ten percent of a population, which is 
likely to be more relevant for highly competitive environments as, for example, in patent races, 
takeover contests, or other performance-related rivalry, where the winner(s) take(s) it all. Second, 
most elicitation methods are distorted by risk attitudes, as in the case of uncalibrated proper scoring 
rules (e.g., Moore and Kim, 2003; Moore and Healy, 2008; Budescu et al., 1997). Given that risk 
attitudes  differ  within  populations  (e.g.,  Bonin  et  al.,  in  press),  differences  in  levels  of 
overconfidence could possibly result from a confound of measuring overconfidence by variations in 
risk attitudes,. Third, in some cases the incentive compatibility of the measurement is based on 
rather limiting assumptions (e.g., Blavatskyy, 2009), such as hidden chaining, epsilon truthfulness, 5 
or  the  requirement  of  perfectly  eliciting  indifference.  These  assumptions  are  to  some  extent 
inconsistent with the aim of providing clear incentives for reporting true confidence levels and, as 
shown in this paper, may cause serious biases in measurements, for instance by classifying too few 
individuals as well-calibrated. 
In this paper, we therefore develop an alternative method of overconfidence elicitation that 
identifies levels of overconfidence, is robust to risk attitudes, and is strictly incentive compatible 
within the framework of rank-dependent utility theories. Moreover, our method enables a direct 
within-subject comparison of absolute and relative overconfidence, as both types are measured with 
the same methodology. 
In the course of developing our method, we formally show strict incentive compatibility of 
the  proposed  design  which  elicits  beliefs  indirectly  without  asking  about  probabilities.  We  then 
apply our method by testing it experimentally. The results support our method by showing a higher 
detection rate of well-calibrated participants than earlier studies. Further, the experiment provides 
first  evidence  for  the  importance  of  measuring  different  levels  of  overconfidence.  We  find  that 
participants are simultaneously over- and underconfident at the population level, depending on the 
thresholds of relative performance. For instance, although ninety-five percent of participants believe 
to  be  better  than  twenty-five  percent  of  the  population  (implying  overconfidence  for  small 
thresholds),  only  seven  percent  believe  to  be  better  than  seventy-five  percent  (implying 
underconfidence for high thresholds). Although this has not been measured before, we argue that the 
application  of  our  method  can  provide  valuable  new  insights  into,  for  instance,  over-  or 
underinvestment in competitive situations, where the winner takes it all, or where it is important to 
be among a relatively small group of top performers. Prominent examples of such situations are 
patent races, where investment in research and development depends on the firm’s confidence in its 
relative  performance,  or  takeover  auctions,  where  the  highest  bid  depends  on  the  acquirer’s 
confidence in realizing enough synergies to refinance the deal. 
The paper is organized as follows. The next section clarifies important definitions in the 
measurement  of  overconfidence  (section  2),  followed  by  a  discussion  of  existing  methods  of 6 
incentivized  overconfidence  elicitation  and  possible  further  improvements  (section  3).  Here,  the 
latest  method,  proposed  by  Blavatskyy  (2009)  in  this  journal,  will  receive  special  attention.  In 
section  4,  we  advance  a  new  experimental  design  for  measuring  absolute  and  relative 
overconfidence  and  formally  show  its  incentive  compatibility.  In  section  5,  we  report  the 
experimental results, compare them with the findings of previously used methods and present the 
unique characteristics of the new method. The final sections, 6 and 7, conclude with a discussion of 
the limitations, future research, and possible implications of measuring levels of overconfidence. 
2  DEFINITIONS 
To ensure precision in the development of our method, we need to define four aspects of 
overconfidence  measurement:  the  distinction  between  overconfidence  and  overprecision;  the 
constructs of confidence in performance and actual performance; the distinction between absolute 
and relative performance; and the definition of incentive compatibility of belief elicitation. 
2.1  Overconfidence versus overprecision 
Considering  the  diverse  contexts  in  which  overconfidence  has  been  investigated,  e.g., 
concerning entrepreneurial or managerial decisions (Camerer and Lovallo, 1999; Wu and Knott, 
2006; Elston et al., 2006; Köllinger et al., 2006; Malmendier and Tate, 2005, 2008), stock trading 
(Daniel et al., 1998; Stotz and Nitzsch, 2005; Cheng 2007), legal practice (Compte and Postlewaite, 
2004), and medical practice (Baumann et al., 1991), it is not surprising that various definitions of 
overconfidence have been  used. Griffin and Varey (1996) distinguish optimistic overconfidence, 
which refers to overestimating the likelihood that an individual’s favored outcome will occur, from 
overestimating  the  validity  of  an  individual’s  judgments  when  there  is  no  personally  favored 
outcome. The latter type of overconfidence is also called overprecision (e.g., Moore and Healy, 
2008) and is typically investigated in so-called calibration studies. While Griffin and Varey (1996) 
regard overprecision as the less general and less stable bias in human decision making, Moore and 
Healy  (2008)  consider  it  to  be  more  persistent  than  optimistic  overconfidence.  We  focus  on 
optimistic  overconfidence  because  –  as  also  discussed  in  the  final  section  of  this  paper  – 7 
measurements of overprecision are often susceptible to confounds by optimistic overconfidence. For 
simplicity, we henceforth refer to optimistic overconfidence simply as ‘overconfidence.’ 
2.2  Confidence in performance versus actual performance 
Because  overconfidence  is  by  definition  the  difference  between  an  individual’s  beliefs 
about  the  chances  of  her  favored  outcome  and  the  actual  likelihood  of  its  happening,  its 
measurement requires a measure of confidence in performance and a measure of actual performance. 
Further, the definitions of both constructs have to be clarified. 
Confidence refers to the probability judgment of a distinct favored outcome of a task, e.g., 
solving  a  specific  number  of  quiz  questions  or  estimation  tasks.  A  person  is  considered 
overconfident  if  the  probability  judgment  is  higher  than  that  person’s  objective  probability  to 
achieve  that outcome. In  many cases, this objective probability is approximated by the actually 
realized outcome of this task. The fact that a person’s actual outcome is an imperfect reflection of 
her objective probability to achieve a specific outcome has rarely been considered, but needs to be 
kept in mind when interpreting overconfidence measurements (Soll, 1996). 
These definitions leave open whether one wants to elicit participants’ abilities to predict 
their maximal performance, their minimal performance, a random performance, or the easiest-to-
predict performance. While most overconfidence measurements implicitly assume that participants 
maximize their performance, e.g., the number of correct answers, optimizing the predictability by 
giving false answers could also be an option, especially when participants are paid for their precision 
in prediction. Overconfidence measurements therefore have to ensure that they measure the type of 
performance  they  claim  to  measure.  We  focus  on  participants’  ability  to  judge  their  maximal 
performance and thus have to make sure that they actually maximize their performance in a task. 
The  measurement  of  confidence  and  performance  is  subject  to  measurement  errors.  To 
minimize  these,  many  overconfidence  studies  have  utilized  repeated  measurements.  Here 
participants  solve  several  tasks  or  quiz  questions  and  indicate  either,  for  each  single  task,  how 
certain they are of a correct answer (e.g., Fischhoff et al., 1977; Fischhoff and MacGregor, 1982), or, 
subsequent to having solved all tasks, how many tasks they expect to have solved correctly. In the 8 
former  case,  the  responses  to  all  tasks  are  averages.  The  latter  measure  represents  a  frequency 
response, which has been shown to be more appropriate (Cesarini et al., 2006). Indeed, the actual 
performance in solving quiz questions is usually measured with respect to the whole set of tasks. For 
reasons  of  comparability  it  thus  makes  sense  to  elicit  the  participants’  confidence  in  their 
performance at the same level as a frequency response. 
2.3  Absolute and relative performance 
While traditional calibration studies have focused on performance judgments related to an 
absolute criterion, e.g., the number of correctly solved trivia questions, an increasing number of 
studies investigate confidence with respect to the performance of others, e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini 
(2005) or Larrick et al. (2007), who call the belief to be better than average ‘overplacement.’ In 
these  studies,  a  participant’s  favored  outcome  is  to  outperform  other  participants.  While 
fundamentally  and  in  technical  terms,  there  is  not  a  huge  difference  between  tasks  that  aim  at 
maximizing a criterion related or not related to other participants, the mental processes that lead to 
judgments related to these two types of tasks might exhibit vital differences. Vautier and Bonnefon 
(2008) show that self-related judgments can psychometrically be distinguished from comparative 
judgments.  Building  on  the  technical  equivalence,  i.e.,  both  types  of  confidence  are  probability 
judgments that can be elicited in a comparable way, one can potentially use the same measurement 
instrument to elicit both types of overconfidence, which makes comparisons of both types, e.g., 
Larrick  et  al.  (2007),  less  susceptible  to  confounds  by  differences  in  elicitation  methods.  The 
technical equivalence also allows drawing on both streams of literature to evaluate methods for 
eliciting confidence and performances. 
2.4  Incentive compatibility of belief elicitation 
The experimental setting for measuring confidence and overconfidence could be considered 
as a principal-agent scenario, where the experimenter as a principal wants participants as agents to 
behave in a certain way, i.e., to tell the truth or, more generally, to behave in a way that reveals some 
hidden information. Accordingly, the development of an experimental design is the equivalent of 
defining  a  payment  scheme  between  a  principal  and  an  agent,  guaranteeing  that  if  the  agent 
maximizes his or her own preferences, the agent behaves according to the principal’s objectives 9 
(Rasmusen, 1989). In such a case, the payment scheme is considered incentive compatible. Applied 
to  belief  elicitation  methods,  incentive  compatibility  describes  the  fact  that  a  participant  is 
confronted with incentives that make her reveal the true belief.  
To theoretically prove incentive compatibility, one needs to make assumptions about the 
decision making of the participants in the experiment. Incentive compatibility is therefore relative to 
a  descriptive  decision  theory.  Hence,  to  develop  an  incentive  compatible  belief  elicitation 
mechanism,  we have to explicitly choose a descriptive decision theory. We use the Cumulative 
Prospect  Theory  (CPT),  a  rank-dependent  utility  theory  which  is  currently  the  most  widely 
established class of descriptive decision theories to explain deviations from expected utility theory 
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1992). Wakker (2004) has shown how to decompose probability weights 
in  CPT  into  risk  preference  and  a  belief.  We  focus  on  the  latter  and  furthermore  include  the 
reduction axiom, which assumes that participants are able to reduce compound lotteries to their 
simple representation. We need this axiom because the experimental method we propose utilizes 
such a compound lottery. The appropriateness of the reduction axiom, which is subject to an ongoing 
discussion, is briefly discussed at the end of this paper. 
We can distinguish two types of incentive compatibility. Applied to belief elicitation, strict 
incentive compatibility implies that revealing the truth is always strictly preferred such that any 
deviation results in lowering the overall value associated with an individual’s decisions. In contrast, 
weak incentive compatibility implies that she cannot improve her situation by not revealing the truth 
(Rasmusen,  1989).  Thus,  asking  individuals  for  their  beliefs  without  providing  any  incentives 
against lying is weakly incentive compatible, but not strictly incentive compatible. To rule out any 
lying, we aim to develop a strictly incentive compatible mechanism for eliciting overconfidence. 
3  OVERCONFIDENCE MEASUREMENTS AND POTENTIAL IMPROVEMENTS 
3.1  Need for incentives 
Already  in  1977  Fischhoff  et  al.  (1977)  raised  doubts  on  whether  participants  in 
overconfidence studies are sufficiently motivated to reveal their true beliefs and therefore introduce 10 
monetary stakes. In recent studies, Cesarini et al. (2006) as well as Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) 
report significant differences depending on whether participants received additional incentives for 
predicting  their  performance  correctly.  These  findings  are  in  line  with  more  general  studies  on 
monetary incentives, like those by Holt and Laury (2002, 2005), who find that elicitation of risk 
attitudes differs with respect to whether or not monetary incentives are provided.  
3.2  Existing methods involving incentives 
To  deter  participants  from  optimizing  the  predictability  of  their  performance  and  to 
incentivize them to maximize their performance instead, Budescu et al. (1997b) and Moore and 
Healy (2008) provide positive monetary payoffs for correctly solved quiz questions. Of course, these 
incentives  should  not  distract  participants  from  predicting  their  performance  as  precisely  as 
possible.
1 Thus, the  most direct  way to incentivize  the reporting of a belief is to give  them an 
additional amount of money if they come sufficiently close (below a prespecified threshold) to the 
actually realized performance (see, e.g., Moore and Kim, 2003). A theoretically sound generalization 
of this idea are so-called proper scoring rules, with the quadratic scoring rule being the most widely 
used  instantiation  (see  Selten,  1998).  Given  this  rule,  which  was,  for  instance,  utilized  in 
overconfidence studies by Budescu et al. (1997b) and by Moore and Healy (2008), participants 
receive a fixed amount of money if they perfectly predict the outcome, while the payoff is reduced 
by the square of the deviation if the prediction is not correct. This provides a strong incentive to 
come as close as possible to the true value, independent of how certain one is (Selten, 1998). 
However,  the  proper  scoring  rules  also  have  some  disadvantages.  First,  they  are  rather 
complex to explain, especially if subjects do not have a sound mathematical background.
2 Second, as 
mentioned above, one needs to make sure that the incentive for a precise prediction does not cause 
adjustments  in  the  performance  in  order  to  increase  its  predictability.  This  requirement  is  only 
                                                 
1  As  mentioned  above,  there  is  a  trade-off  between  maximizing  performance  and  maximizing 
predictability. This trade-off has not received much attention in the literature on overconfidence 
measurements  as  yet,  but  recently  Blavatskyy  (2009)  proposed  an  elegant  way  to  avoid  it.  We 
explain his method below together with our own approach. 
2 The complexity is reason enough for Moore and Healy (2008) to address participants’ trust rather 
than  their  understanding  of  the  mechanism.  They  instruct  them  as  follows:  “This  formula  may 
appear complicated, but what it means for you is very simple: You get paid the most when you 
honestly report your best guesses about the likelihood of each of the different possible outcomes.” 11 
satisfied in specific measurement settings, such as ‘true/false’ quiz questions with only two possible 
answers. Third, a further weakness of proper scoring rules is that they are not robust to variations in 
risk attitudes (Offerman et al., 2007). Participants with different risk attitudes will provide different 
responses even if they hold the same belief. To overcome this weakness, Offerman et al. (2007) 
suggest calibrating the quadratic scoring rule for every single participant. However, this has not been 
done in overconfidence studies yet and would make the experimental design even more complex.  
Recent research on individuals’ beliefs to be better than others has suggested alternative 
methods to elicit (relative) overconfidence; some of which can also be applied to elicit confidence in 
(absolute) performance. Moore and Kim (2003) provide participants with a fixed amount of money 
and allow them to wager as much as they want on their performance. If they succeed in solving a 
task, i.e., solving it correctly, the wagered amount is doubled. The basic idea is that the more likely 
one  is  to  win,  the  more  one  would  invest  into  own  performance.  While  this  method  has  the 
advantage of avoiding explicit probability judgments and could be perceived as simpler than proper 
scoring rules, it is not robust to risk attitudes. The more risk averse a participant is, the less she 
wagers, which confounds the measurement of the participant’s belief with his or her risk attitude. 
While the investment approach is principally a trade-off between a safe income and a risky 
income, where the risk is rooted in own performance, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) and Blavatskyy 
(2009) suggest eliciting overconfidence by implementing a trade-off between the performance risks 
and a lottery with predetermined odds. Hoelzl and Rustichini utilize this idea for measuring better-
than-average beliefs by letting participants choose between playing a fifty-fifty lottery and being 
paid if they are better than fifty percent of all participants. Blavatskyy (2009) measures absolute 
overconfidence  in  answering  trivia  questions  and  lets  participants  choose  between  being  paid 
according to their performance and playing a lottery. The first option results in a fixed payoff M if a 
randomly drawn question has been answered correctly. The second option yields the same payoff M 
with a probability that equals the fraction of questions that have been answered correctly so that the 
expected value of both options is equivalent. However, participants are not told how many questions 
they have answered correctly, nor do they know that the lottery’s odds are based on this number. 12 
Participants  choosing  the  lottery  are  considered  underconfident.  Those  that  choose  to  be  paid 
according to their performance are considered overconfident. If they are indifferent between both 
alternatives (indicated by an explicit response leading to a random choice between both), they are 
considered well-calibrated. This method has empirically been found to be robust to risk attitudes 
(Blavatskyy, 2009). 
Blavatskyy’s (2009) method to elicit beliefs about own performance is in fact a special 
application  of  what  Offerman  et  al.  (2007)  call  measuring  canonical  probabilities,  and  what 
Abdellaoui et al. (2005) label the elicitation of choice-based probabilities. These methods aim at 
eliciting an individual’s belief about the probability of a binary random process with payoffs H and 
L. This is done by determining a probability for a binary lottery with the same payoffs H and L such 
that  individuals  are  indifferent  between  the  random  process  and  the  lottery.  Since  this  lottery 
represents  an  equivalent  to  the  random  process,  the  probability  of  the  lottery  is  considered  the 
(canonical) probability associated with the random process. These methods have theoretically been 
shown  to  be  robust  to  risk  attitudes  (Wakker,  2004),  supporting  Blavatskyy’s  (2009)  empirical 
finding.  
3.3  Potential improvements 
Although some of the points discussed in this section also apply to other studies, we focus 
on Blavatskyy’s (2009) method, because it represents the state of the art in overconfidence research 
and, more importantly, offers some desirable characteristics: it manages to integrate the incentives 
for performance maximization and for the elicitation of true beliefs about this performance, it is 
robust to risk attitudes, and it does not rely on verbally stated probability judgments. Furthermore, it 
is incentive compatible, although, as we will show below, not strictly incentive compatible. 
Despite the method’s elegance and potential, however, it also has some weaknesses that call 
for improvements. These relate to its incentive compatibility, its classification of well-calibrated 
individuals,  and  its  limitation  in  eliciting  only  three  levels  of  confidence,  i.e.,  overconfidence, 
underconfidence,  and  well-calibrated  confidence.  Furthermore,  it  is  restricted  to  eliciting 13 
overconfidence  in  absolute  abilities  and  does  not  generalize  easily  to  eliciting  relative 
overconfidence. 
3.3.1  Incentive compatibility 
Blavatskyy’s (2009) method makes use of hidden chaining, where participants do not know 
that the lotteries they are confronted with in a subsequent step of the experiment are actually based 
on the choices they made in earlier steps, i.e., when solving their quiz questions. If participants knew 
about  the  chaining,  they  would  also  know  that  the  options  to  choose  from  in  the  second  step 
represent  identical  winning  chances.  As  a  consequence,  they  would  always  be  indifferent.  For 
eliciting participants' confidence, Blavatskyy’s (2009) method therefore requires that participants do 
not know about this chaining and, more precisely, erroneously believe that there is no chaining. 
Accordingly, the design requires the experimenter to convince participants of a false belief about 
how their outcomes are affected by their choices. This assumption is in conflict with the salience 
requirement  in  experimental  economics,  which  requires  that  participants  correctly  know  and 
understand all the rules, how their payoffs are determined.
3 A similar argument was established by 
Harrison (1986) with respect to the experimental design presented by Becker et al. (1964), as well as 
by Harrison and Rutström (2008) with respect to the trade-off method introduced by Wakker and 
Deneffe (1996) and extended by Abdellaoui (2000). For an improved method of overconfidence 
measurement, we therefore suggest an elicitation procedure that does not utilize hidden chaining. 
3.3.2  Classification of well-calibrated confidence 
Another  characteristic  of  Blavatskyy’s  (2009)  design  is  the  assumption  of  epsilon 
truthfulness, which states that participants tell the truth when there is no incentive to lie (Rasmusen, 
1989; Cummings et al., 1997). If they are indifferent between choosing to be paid according to their 
performance and being paid according to a lottery, then Blavatskyy’s design expects participants to 
explicitly  indicate  that  indifference.  Only  if  they  do  this,  are  they  classified  as  well-calibrated. 
                                                 
3 Salience requires that “the reward received by the subject depends on her actions (and those of 
other agents) as defined by institutional rules that she understands. That is, the relation between 
actions and the reward implements the desired institution, and  subjects understand the relation” 
(Friedman and Sunder, 1994, p. 13). It is thus commonly understood that participants in economic 
experiments have perfect knowledge about how their choices affect their outcomes. 14 
Without the assumption of epsilon truthfulness, any distribution of overconfident, underconfident, 
and well-calibrated measurements can be explained by a population of well-calibrated participants 
who choose randomly in case of indifference. Only under the assumption of epsilon truthfulness, 
self-reporting beliefs without incentives is sufficient to let participants reveal their true beliefs (the 
indifference) because there is no (monetary) incentive either to lie or to tell the truth. However, as 
Blavatskyy’s  method  generally  incentivizes  belief  elicitation  with  regard  to  over-  and 
underconfidence, it is contradictory to rely on (non-incentivized) epsilon truthfulness when it comes 
to  the  identification  of  well-calibrated  behavior.  Our  method  therefore  aims  at  strict  incentive 
compatibility without the need to assume epsilon truthfulness. 
Related to the identification of well-calibrated participants is the fact that in Blavatskyy’s 
(2009) design the probability that a well-calibrated participant is indifferent (and is thus correctly 
classified as such) approaches zero.
4 Indeed, with six and a quarter percent (three participants) the 
share of well-calibrated participants in Blavatskyy's (2009) study is rather small. In the experimental 
test of our own method of overconfidence measurement, we therefore expect a significantly higher 
percentage of well-calibrated confidence than reported in Blavatskyy (2009). 
3.3.3  Precision and comparability of confidence measurements 
Despite being rooted in well-established belief elicitation methods, the methods suggested 
both by Blavatskyy (2009) and Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) only reveal whether or not a belief 
exceeds  a  certain  threshold.  In  Blavatskyy  (2009),  subjects  are  classified  as  overconfident, 
underconfident  or  well-calibrated,  but  it  is  impossible  to  state  whether  one  is  more  or  less 
overconfident than another. Similarly, Hoelzl and Rustichini (2005) can only show that a participant 
                                                 
4 To illustrate this, assume that a participant is well-calibrated, which means that her confidence is 
equal  to  the  expected  performance.  According  to  Blavatskyy’s  (2009)  method,  a  participant  is 
classified as well-calibrated if her confidence is equal to the realized performance (not the expected 
performance). Note that as long as the tasks involve a stochastic component, i.e., include imperfect 
knowledge, the realized performance is a random variable represented by a distribution with a mean 
mirroring the expected performance of a participant. The values that the realized performance can 
take  are  determined  by  the  number  of  tasks  solved  and  do  not  need  to  contain  the  mean.  If 
performances are assumed to be drawn from a continuous distribution, then the probability that a 
participant’s true performance, whether she is well-calibrated or not, perfectly matches the realized 
performance,  approaches  zero.  Because  Blavatskyy’s  (2009)  method  classifies  only  those 
participants as well-calibrated whose confidence perfectly matches the realized performance, the 
probability to classify a well-calibrated participant as such approaches zero. 15 
believes to be worse or better than fifty percent of all participants, but not whether she believes to be 
better than thirty or seventy percent.  
Hoelzl and Rustichini consider a population as overconfident if more than fifty percent 
believe to be better than fifty percent. While this definition of overconfidence does indeed describe a 
population’s relative overconfidence in being better than average, we argue that this classification 
does not generalize to other levels of performance, because levels of relative overconfidence have 
been found to depend on the level of task difficulty (e.g., Larrick et al., 2007; Moore and Healy, 
2008). Thus, a population could be overconfident with respect to being better than average, but 
simultaneously underconfident with respect to belonging to, e.g., the top twenty-five percent of a 
population.  It  is  therefore  important  to  measure  beliefs  more  precisely.  By  determining  the 
percentage of a population which believes to be better than the rest of this population, our method 
can measure different degrees of a population’s overconfidence. Based on the experimental test of 
our method, we will be able to plot altogether ten levels of a population’s relative confidence in a 
range of from five to ninety-five percent. 
In addition to measuring overconfidence and underconfidence at more levels, our method 
also  allows  a  direct  comparison  between  (absolute)  overconfidence  and  relative  overconfidence. 
This enables new empirical tests in an ongoing theoretical debate. Moore and Healy (2008) propose 
a theory, which they have tested, based on Bayesian updating that explains why individuals who are 
overconfident  also  believe  that  they  perform  below  average,  and  those  who  are  underconfident 
believe that they perform above average. Larrick et al. (2007) show under which conditions Moore 
and Healy’s results can be expected and argue that relative confidence and (absolute) confidence, 
both being part of overconfidence, essentially represent a common  underlying  factor: subjective 
ability. Our improvements measure (absolute) confidence and relative confidence with the same 
incentive compatible method and therefore enable a more robust comparison of both constructs. Our 
experimental test, which is based on the new method, thus represents a first step toward such a 
comparison of (absolute) confidence and relative confidence. 16 
4  DEVELOPMENT OF A NEW METHOD 
In an attempt  to improve the  measurement of overconfidence along the lines discussed 
above, we propose a method that elicits canonical probabilities based on binary choices. We thereby 
build on methods suggested for belief elicitation with respect to probabilities that do not depend on  
own  activities  (Abdellaoui  et  al.,  2005).  The  choice  is  between  being  paid  according  to  own 
performance (success or failure) and participating in a lottery with a given winning probability. The 
new method combines the strengths of Blavatskyy’s (2009) method with improvements based on our 
discussion  in  the  previous  section.  Instead  of  utilizing  hidden  chaining,  we  ask  participants  for 
multiple binary choices, one of which is randomly selected to determine the payoff (random lottery 
design). We utilize choices between being paid according to performance in general and being paid 
according  to  a  lottery’s  outcome  (as  in  Blavatskyy,  2009)  to  approximate  the  indifference 
probability.  By  selecting  an  appropriate  set  of  choices,  our  measurement  method  classifies 
participants as well-calibrated if their confidence level is closer to the actually realized performance 
than to any other possible performance level. This removes the need for well-calibrated participants 
to explicitly indicate their indifference.  
The new method can be applied to various definitions of performance. We exemplify this 
by eliciting performance beliefs with respect to two different types of performance, absolute and 
relative. Both are based on participants’ answers to ten quiz questions without feedback. We selected 
these questions from a larger set of questions with an equivalent level of difficulty. 
(1)  Absolute  performance:  a  participant  succeeds  if  she  answered  one  quiz 
question correctly and failed otherwise. The question is determined randomly. 
(2)  Relative performance: a participant succeeds if she answered more questions 
correctly than another randomly assigned participant who answered the same 
questions. She  fails if she answered  fewer questions. If  both answered the 
same number of questions correctly, one is considered to have succeeded and 
the  other  to  have  failed.  If  this  happens,  who  succeeds  and  who  fails  is 
determined randomly.  17 
We do not directly translate the absolute performance measurement (1) into the relative 
measurement (2), because this requires participants to elicit their belief about the probability that 
they have a higher probability to be correct compared to other participants. We believe that this 
would be rather complicated to communicate to participants. We therefore ask them to compare the 
number of correct questions, which is easier for participants to understand. As the number of correct 
questions is the best estimate of the probability to be correct, the direct and the indirect measure we 
use for the absolute and relative performance are, in fact, equivalent. 
4.1  Experimental design 
The experiment consists of five stages. Although these are explained below, more details 
can be found in the instructions in the appendix. 
Step  1:  Test  for  understanding  the  instructions:  To  ensure  that  participants  correctly 
understand  the  instructions,  see  Appendix  B,  where  they  had  to  answer  ten  yes/no  questions 
regarding the experimental design. They could only proceed if all answers were correct. 
Step 2: Solving quiz questions: As usual in overconfidence experiments, participants solve 
ten quiz questions without feedback. For this experiment we used multiple choice questions with 
four possible answers. These ten questions are randomly drawn from a set of 28 questions. We 
selected these questions from a larger set used by Eberlein et al. (2006) that were correctly answered 
by forty to fifty percent of the participants. 
Step 3: Select card stack and relevant quiz question: The experimenter presents ten stacks 
of 20 cards each, containing 1, 3, 5, ..., 17, 19 cards with a green cross (wins) and a complementary 
number of white cards (blanks). Participants do not see the number of green cards and do not (yet) 
know the distribution of green cards. One randomly drawn participant can inspect the stacks, and 
after  mixing  them  again  another  participant  randomly  chooses  one  stack.  All  other  stacks  are 
removed. The same procedure is repeated for a second set of 10 stacks of cards. The experimenter 
also lets one participant draw one card out of a third stack of 10 (numbered from 1 to 10) that 
determines the question that counts for the absolute performances of all participants. 18 
Step 4: Strategy-based choice: This part of the experiment is split into two steps. In a first 
step, participants choose between being paid according to their absolute performance and drawing a 
card from stack one. In a second step, they choose between being paid according to their relative 
performance and a card from stack two. Participants thus choose twice between two payoff schemes. 
At that time, they do not know the number of green cards in the stack that was previously selected in 
Step 3. However, we allow participants to condition their choice, as shown on the screenshot in the 
appendix and in the following example of their response: “If there are 5 green and 15 white cards in 
the stack and I have the choice between ‘cards’ and ‘quiz - own results,’ I choose ...,” followed by a 
choice between ‘cards’ and  ‘quiz - own results.’ This  mechanism  mirrors the  so-called strategy 
method introduced by Selten (1967), which is usually applied to game theoretical experiments (e.g., 
Selten et al., 1997), but is applied here to a situation without strategic interaction. One half of the 
participants  (randomly  determined)  complete  the  two  steps  in  reverse  order,  i.e.,  relative 
performance first and absolute performance second.
5 
Step 5: Disclosure of cards and application of participants’ strategies: In a last step, the 
number of green cards in the two stacks and the number of the relevant question are disclosed. 
Participants who chose to draw a card from any of the two stacks can individually draw a card.
6 
Payoffs are calculated and individually paid to participants. 
4.2  Measurements 
Our experimental design provides us with the following individual measurements:  
(1)  Absolute performance p as the number of correctly answered questions, divided by 10. The 
value is an integer value between 0 and 1. 
(2)  Relative performance rp is 1 if one participant was better than the other randomly assigned 
participant, 0 if one was worse, and 0.5 if one solved as many question as the other. 
                                                 
5 Rationally, for an increasing number of green cards participants should never choose performance-
based  payoff  once  they  have  chosen  cards  for  less  green  cards.  If  participants  violated  this 
assumption, the software displayed a popup with the text “Please check your input. Are you really 
sure? Yes, continue / No, back.” For a single person, a sequence ended with “performance,” “cards,” 
“performance.” This “cards” choice was considered as “performance.” 
6 The individual random draw is used because we wanted to avoid that by accident all lose, which 
would be bad for the reputation of the lab, or all win, which would be bad for our budget. 19 
(3)  Confidence c in own absolute performance is the mean of (i) the highest probability for 
cards for which a participant would choose the absolute performance-based payoff rule and 
(ii) the lowest probability for cards for which a participant would choose the draw of a card 
from the stack of cards. If one participant always, respectively never, chooses the cards, 
then confidence is set to 0.0 respectively 1.0 (both cases did not occur).  
(4)  Relative confidence rc in relative performance is the mean of (i) the highest probability for 
which a participant would choose the relative performance-based payoff rule, and (ii) the 
lowest probability for which a participant would choose the draw of a card from the stack of 
cards. If a participant always, respectively never, chooses the cards, then confidence is set 
to 0.0 respectively 1.0 (both cases did not occur). 
(5)  Absolute  overconfidence  oc  is  the  difference  between  absolute  confidence  and  absolute 
performance, oc=c-p. We consider participants as well-calibrated, when overconfidence oc 
equals zero. Note that c is an approximation of a participant’s confidence, and the exact 
value  of  c  lies  in  the  closed  interval  between  c=-0.05  and  c=+0.05.  As  shown  below, 
participants are well-calibrated when their confidence is closer to their performance than to 
any other possible performance.  
(6)  Relative overconfidence roc is computed analogously to oc. 
4.3  Formal proof of strict incentive compatibility 
Before we report the results of the experimental test, we formally show that our improved 
method is strictly incentive  compatible and that it has the claimed properties. First, participants 
prefer  a  higher  performance  over  a  lower  one,  i.e.,  they  maximize  their  performance.  Second, 
participants choose the lottery if the winning probability of the lottery is at least as high as their 
believed performance.
7 Third, a participant is considered well-calibrated if her true performance 
expectation is closer to the actually realized performance than to any other possible performance. 
Fourth, elicited probability judgments are theoretically robust to risk attitudes. 
                                                 
7 This also covers the case of exact equality, which does not need any further requirements. 20 
In order to formally show the incentive compatibility (formally), it is necessary to make 
assumptions about the participants’ behavior in the form of a descriptive decision theory. In this 
paper, we apply the cumulative prospect theory (CPT) by Tversky and Kahneman (1992), although 
the following proof holds for expected utility theory, too, and can be extended to a variety of related 
decision theories. Since CPT does not explicitly consider compound lotteries, i.e., lotteries over 
lotteries (used in our experiment), we need to include the reduction axiom (Starmer and Sudgen, 
1991) as an additional assumption. It states that participants can reduce compound lotteries to their 
simple representation. Within the framework of CPT and the reduction axiom the claimed properties 
of our experimental design can be proven. The proof will be applied to the specific design we use in 
our experiment, including the double elicitation of (absolute) confidence and relative confidence. 
With  marginal  adjustments,  the  proof  also  holds  if  the  two  types  of  confidence  are  considered 
individually. 
Participants  are  confronted  with  N  choices  for  each  of  the  two  elicited  confidences;  N 
therefore determines the precision. In our specific case, N equals 10. Without loss of generality, let 
ca,i  ∈  {0,1}  with  1≤i≤N  be  the  participant’s  choice  between  being  paid  according  to  own 
performance and the lottery i with winning probability pLi . In our case, the lottery i is characterized 
by 2i-1 winning cards among the total of 2N cards (in our case, it results in 20 cards); thus, pLI=(i-
0.5)/N. If the task is chosen (and not the lottery), ca,i equals 1, otherwise 0. Let cr,i ∈ {0,1} be the 
same for the choices between relative performance and a lottery. Vectors ca=( ca,1, ca,2,… , ca,N) and 
cr=( cr,1, cr,2,… , cr,N) represent vectors of these decisions. Furthermore, let q be the performance 
expectation by the participant. Let us assume that the ex ante performance of the participant varies 
between qmin and qmax, i.e qmin ≤ q ≤ qmax (depending on the participant’s choice). Let us further 
assume that the expectation of the relative performance rq is a strictly monotonic function of the 
performance expectation, i.e., the first derivative of rq’(q) is strictly larger than 0. Let H be the 
amount of money that can be won in the lottery or earned when the task (absolute or relative) has 
been performed successfully. If the lottery is lost or the task has not been performed successfully 
then a participant earns nothing. As participants are assumed to follow cumulative prospect theory, 
the preference value V for a given set of decisions (ca, cr, q) is given by (1), with p being the belief 21 
about the occurrence of payoff H. The function v(x) represents the CPT value function applied to 
payoffs  with  v(0)=0.  For  simplicity,  we  also  assume  that  v(x)>0  for  x>0.  The  function  π(p) 
represents the CPT probability weighting function with π(p)∈[0,1] . Both functions are assumed to 
be monotonically increasing in the payoff x respectively the probability p. 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) q c c p H v H q c c V r a r a , , , , , π =   (1) 
Applying  the  reduction  axiom,  a  participant  is  assumed  to  form  a  belief  about  the 
occurrence of H depending on her decisions, and she is able to reduce compound lotteries to their 
simple  representation.  This  is  necessary  as  our  method  implements  a  random  choice  between 
alternatives that are themselves uncertain Since each of the 2N (in our case 20) choices between the 
absolute respectively relative performance and a lottery can become relevant with equal probability, 
the probability for H is the average of the probabilities of all single decisions (ca,1 to ca,N and cr,1 to 
cr,N). As shown in (2), for a single decision (between absolute performance and lottery with winning 
probability pLi) the probability is determined by ca,i q + (1-ca,i) pLi, which is q if the performance is 
chosen and pLi  if the lottery is chosen. For the choice between relative performance and a lottery the 
probability of a payoff H is determined correspondingly. 
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Note that V(ca,cr,q,H) is always larger than or equal to zero. Equation 2 can be simplified to 
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with the following derivatives with respect to the decision variables:   22 
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The terms v(H) and π’(p) are by definition strictly positive. Given that rq’(q) is strictly 
larger and c1i and c2i are never less than 0, we can conclude that the preference value is strictly 
increasing in q as long as at least one decision is made in favor of being paid according to own 
absolute or relative performance, i.e., at least one ca,i or cr,i equals 1. In our mechanism, this is only 
the case if the belief about own performance or the belief about relative performance is greater than 
five percent. Below this threshold, being paid according to own absolute or relative performance is 
never  chosen,  and  thus  there  is  no  strict  incentive  to  maximize  this  performance,  i.e.,  the  first 
derivative is zero. However, the minimal expected probability of success with respect to absolute 
performance  in  our  experiment  is  twenty-five  percent  (random  choice  out  of  four  answers  per 
question)  such  that  the  belief  about  own  performance  always  lies  above  five  percent.  Hence,  a 
participant always maximizes her performance expectation.
8  
Furthermore, the preference value is strictly increasing in the decisions cx,i for x being a or 
r, if q respectively rq(q) are greater than the winning probability of the alternative lottery. Thus, 
participants will always choose the task if their belief about a good performance is greater than the 
probability to win the lottery. Participants therefore always reveal their true beliefs through their 
choice behavior. If they do not choose the lottery for lottery i but for i+1, then the best estimation of 
the participant’s belief is (pLi + pLi+1)/2, which in our case is i/N.  
Note that participants with a confidence between i/N-0.05 and i/N+0.05 are all classified to 
have a confidence level of i/N. Such participants are considered well-calibrated if they have solved i 
out of N tasks correctly. Therefore, even if their confidence level differs only slightly from the 
elicited  performance,  they  will  still  be  classified  as  well-calibrated.  This  holds  as  long  as  the 
                                                 
8 Note that when excluding the elicitation of confidence in absolute performance such a lower thres-
hold for performance expectations is not present. 23 
difference between confidence and actual performance does not exceed 1/2N, which is equivalent to 
the condition that confidence is closer to another level of performance that could be elicited. 
All results above are based on CPT and the reduction axiom. As such, they are independent 
of  an  individual’s  risk  attitude  as  long  as  it  satisfies  the  axioms  of  CPT.  Our  results  are  thus 
theoretically  robust  to  variations  in  risk  attitudes,  modeled  via  value  and  probability  weighting 
functions with characteristics following CPT. 
4.4  Experimental sessions and participants 
We conducted the experiment in two sessions, on August 25 and September 1, 2008, with 
altogether 31 women and 29 men, who were recruited from the student body of the University of 
Jena, Germany. Their average age was 23.85 years, with a minimum of 18 years, a maximum of 30 
years, and a standard deviation of 2.45. We recruited students from all disciplines, ranging from the 
natural to the social sciences, with the exception of psychology, the reason being that psychology 
students might have had previous experience with psychological experiments in which critically 
different mechanisms are frequently used. These experiences might have produced an ex ante bias in 
the  students’  expectations  with  regard  to  our  (economic)  experiment;  more  specifically,  these 
students might not have trusted the experimenter. On average, the experimental session lasted 60 
minutes, and participants earned 11.10 euro. 
5  RESULTS 
Table  1  provides  some  summary  statistics  for  our  experiment.  The  average  absolute 
performance p is 0.497 with a median of 0.5; the average relative performance is 0.5 with a median 
of 0.5. On average, participants have a confidence in their performance of 0.493 with median 0.5 and 
a confidence in  their relative performance of 0.498 with  a  median 0.5.
9 In this experiment, the 
                                                 
9 Two out of 60 participants violated a basic principle, namely that under the condition that an 
individual tries to maximize her performance the probability to win in a multiple choice task with 
four alternatives is at least 25%. One participant switched between 15% and 25%. It is, however, 
possible that this person had a confidence of 25% and was therefore indifferent between the 25% 
lottery and her performance. Choosing the lottery in this case is still rational and consistent. The 
behavior of the second person who switched between 5% and 15% is, however, not captured by the 24 
participants are thus, on average, well-calibrated in absolute and in relative terms. We did not find 
any order effects; the order of elicitation of absolute and relative confidence did not cause significant 





Table 1 also reports the correlation of variables with performance p, and with confidence 
regarding  absolute  and  relative  performance.  We  find  that  (absolute)  performance  and  relative 
performance  are  positively  correlated,  as  one  would  have  expected,  because  participants  with  a 
higher performance have a greater chance to be better than others. Participants are partially aware of 
their  performance  as  their  (absolute)  confidence  and  relative  confidence  in  their  performance 
increasing with their performance (Pearson correlations are significant at the five percent level). 
However, (absolute) overconfidence and relative overconfidence in performance both decrease with 
the level of their performance. This result is consistent with prior findings in overconfidence studies. 
Based  on  their  theory  and  empirical  results,  Moore  and  Healy  (2008)  argue  that,  with  higher 
performance, participants tend to become less overconfident and even underconfident, but at the 
same time believe to be better than others. While the theory by Moore and Healy (2008) tentatively 
suggests a negative correlation between relative confidence rc and overconfidence oc, we find a 
positive relation in our data. We furthermore find a positive correlation between overconfidence 
oc=c-p  and  confidence  c,  which  means  that  the  more  confident  a  participant  is,  the  more 
overconfident  she  becomes  (Pearson  correlation  is  0.47  with  p<0.05).  To  better  understand  the 
relation between correlations involving overconfidence oc=c-p and relative overconfidence roc=rc-
rp, on one side, and statistics about the constituent terms, c, rc, p, and rp, on the other, we refer the 
reader to Appendix A in Larrick at al. (2007), which provides a formal analysis of correlations that 
can be extended to many cases, where one variable in a correlation is used to calculate the second 
variable in that correlation.  
                                                                                                                                        
theories applied here, i.e., rank-dependent utility theories. Since results do not change qualitatively, 
we kept this data point in the data set 25 
5.1  Well-calibrated participants 
When developing our elicitation method, we we expected that more participants would be 
classified as  well-calibrated than  in Blavatskyy’s (2009) study. Figure 1 compares Blavatskyy’s 
results with our own. The left-hand graph shows the distribution of performances within the data 
sets.  The  mean  performance  is  slightly  higher  in  Blavatskyy’s  study,  i.e.,  fifty-five  versus  fifty 
percent in our study, and the variance of performance is also greater in his study, i.e., 0.0485 versus 
0.0329. The right-hand graph in Figure 1 plots the relative frequency of participants classified as 
underconfident, well-calibrated, and overconfident. As expected, we find that in our study more 
participants are identified as well-calibrated, i.e., twenty-three versus six percent in Blavatskyy’s 
study. Based on a Chi-square test, we find that the two binary distributions of well-calibrated versus 
not well-calibrated participants are different and statistically significant at the five percent level. 
This fully supports our expectation.  
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Figure 1  
----------------------------------------------------- 
 
5.2  Simultaneous over- and underconfidence at the population level 
Above  we  argued  for  a  more  precise  measurement  of  several  levels  of  over-  and 
underconfidence instead of focusing on a binary belief to be better or worse than the average of a 
population (e.g., Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005). If it is important to be among the top five percent of a 
population, an optimistic better-than-average belief may not generalize to an optimistic better-than-
top five percent belief. As Table 1 reports, relative confidence, i.e., the perceived probability that 
one participant is better than another correlates positively with (absolute) performance, and, even 
more importantly, relative overconfidence correlates negatively with performance. This suggests that 
the better a participant is, the less she is unrealistically optimistic regarding her position relative to 
others. At the population level, it is thus possible that about fifty percent believe to be better than 
fifty percent ─ indicating a  well-calibrated population (Hoelzl and Rustichini, 2005) ─ but that 
significantly less than twenty-five percent believe to be better than seventy-five percent. 
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Figure 2  
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Figure  2  addresses  this  question  by  plotting  the  relative  frequency  of  participants  who 
believe to be better than five, fifteen, twenty-five, …, and ninety-five percent. Consistent with our 
conclusion from the mean of relative confidence, approximately fifty percent believe to be better 
than fifty percent of all participants. Thus, regarding this benchmark the group of our participants is 
neither over- nor underconfident. However, considering other benchmarks, the conclusion differs. 
About ninety-five percent of all participants believe to be better than twenty-five percent, implying 
overconfidence for a small threshold; but only about seven percent believe to be better than seventy-
five percent, implying underconfidence. Our group of participants is therefore underconfident for 
large and overconfident for small thresholds.  
5.3  Confidence in absolute versus relative performance 
In  our  experiment,  we  used  the  new  method  to  elicit  confidence  in  own  absolute 
performance (confidence) and confidence in own relative performance (relative confidence) with the 
same  methodology and at the same time. This enables a direct comparison of the two types of 
confidence. A correlation of 0.728 (see Table 1) already indicates that both are closely related. 
Figure 3 visualizes the relation between both variables. Besides plotting the data points, it provides 
conditional means and a fitted linear approximation of the relation between both variables. Since 
both are subject to measurement errors, conditional means as well as simple regression analysis yield 
biased results; especially the slope of the fitted linear function  might be attenuated.
10 However, 
running a direct regression (variable 1 on variable 2) and a reverse regression (variable 2 on variable 
1), as illustrated in Figure 3, provides bounds on the true parameter (Wansbeek and Meijer, 2000). 
Despite one outlier with little relative confidence but more or less average (absolute) confidence, 
Figure 3 suggests a very compelling relation of confidence and relative confidence. In fact,  we 
cannot reject the hypothesis that both are identical for our data. Although this identity might not be 
                                                 
10  For  an  in-depth  discussion  of  the  consequences  of  measurement  errors  for  overconfidence 
research, see Erev et al. (1994), Soll (1996), Pfeifer (2994), Brenner et al. (1996), and Juslin and 
Olsson (2000). 27 
observed in experiments, where the average performance is not fifty percent, we would nevertheless 
expect a close relation of both constructs, although at a different level. 
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Figure 3  
----------------------------------------------------- 
6  DISCUSSION 
In developing our method, we have focused on measuring optimistic overconfidence in 
contrast to overprecision. As this is an important distinction (see section 2 about definitions), our 
choice of focus is discussed in more detail below. Subsequently, we discuss four limitations of this 
study, highlight its implications, and suggest avenues for further research. 
6.1  Why we do not measure overprecision 
While  overconfidence  and  overprecision  are  related,  we  have  focused  on  measuring 
overconfidence. Besides overconfidence being the more robust belief distortion (Griffin and Varey, 
1996),  we  initially  argued  that  measuring  overprecision  is  likely  to  be  confounded  by 
overconfidence. Overprecision has often been measured by asking subjects to estimate the numerical 
answer to a question and subsequently to report a confidence interval around this number (e.g., 
Fischhoff et al., 1977; Cesarini et al., 2006). This is usually repeated for a number of questions. 
Overprecision refers to the phenomenon that most of these confidence intervals are found to be too 
narrow. Following Cesarini et al. (2006), we argue that asking for an estimate makes participants 
favor  a  narrow  over  a  wider  interval,  indicating  a  less  precise  estimation.  Similarly,  asking 
participants for estimates that come sufficiently close, i.e., within a given interval around the target 
value, as done by Larrick et al. (2007), as well as asking them to solve trivia questions and judge 
their likelihood to solve them correctly (Moore and Healy, 2008), make the former prefer a correct 
answer. The salience of a notion of good performance in measurements of overprecision increases 
even  more if interval elicitations are extended by asking participants for their estimation of the 
number of intervals that correctly capture the real number as in the case of Cesarini et al. (2006), or 
by asking them for the estimation and a probability of being correct, e.g., Fischhoff et al. (1977). 28 
Most of the overprecision  measurements can therefore be interpreted to be based on measuring 
optimistic overconfidence in a setting, where own performance equals precision of judgments. If 
participants suffer from optimistic overconfidence, they exaggerate their likelihood of performing 
well and, by the same token, of estimating the numbers or solving the questions correctly. These 
optimistic  overconfident  participants  will  therefore  appear  to  exhibit  overprecision.  If  precision 
directly  or  indirectly  becomes  the  performance  benchmark,  then  overprecision  and  optimistic 
overconfidence cannot be perfectly distinguished. This is the reason why we have focused purely on 
optimistic overconfidence and consider beliefs about outcomes that are favored. 
6.2  Limitations and further research 
Among the salient limitations of our method is, first, the fact that the theoretical proof of 
incentive compatibility requires the reduction axiom for the random lottery mechanism. This axiom 
has been challenged with respect to its empirical justification, particularly in connection with the use 
of random lottery mechanisms, which is widespread in experimental economics. However, empirical 
studies  on  whether  or  not  the  mechanism  leads  to  distortion  conclude  that  “experimenters  can 
continue to use the random-lottery incentive mechanism” (Hey and Lee, 2005, p. 263). Their results 
are consistent with what has been found by many others, for instance Starmer and Sugden (1991) 
and, most recently, Lee (2008) published in this journal.
11 
A second limitation relates to the question whether or not the incentives make participants 
more  or  less  well-calibrated.  We  replicate  findings  by  Blavatskyy  (2009)  that,  on  average, 
participants are well-calibrated. While one might be tempted to attribute this to the incentivized 
methods, a theory recently put forward by Moore and Healy (2007, 2008) provides an alternative 
explanation.  The  authors  suggest  that,  for  intermediate  levels  of  difficulty,  participants  are,  on 
                                                 
11 To ensure that participants take every decision as if it was the only one, we additionally adjusted 
the traditional random lottery method. Instead of randomly selecting the relevant decision at the end, 
we physically selected a decision at the beginning of the experiment, but kept it covered until the 
end. We then asked participants to condition their decisions such that they respond “If this choice is 
…, then I will choose … .” This design does not require participants to envision a future random 
draw. Instead, they observe the crucial element of the design before they make their decisions. This 
design applies the strategy method, developed for experiments on strategic interaction (Selten et al., 
1997), to a decision experiment, where one person plays against nature.  29 
average, neither over- nor underconfident. In our study the levels of difficulty, i.e., the average 
performance, are close to fifty percent, which has also been found in the study by Blavatskyy (2009).  
Our method includes a parameter N describing the number of binary choices used to elicit 
confidence  beliefs.  In  our  method,  the  precision  of  performance  elicitation  is  driven  by  this 
parameter.  Increasing  N  also  increases  the  precision  of  both  confidence  and  performance 
measurements. Note, as a third limitation, that the probability to identify a well-calibrated participant 
subsequently decreases. Studies that refer to a dichotomous classification of well-calibrated versus 
ill-calibrated participants should account for this dependency on the precision of measurements. We 
therefore recommend to base overconfidence analyses on a range of degrees of confidence and 
overconfidence instead of dichotomous or trichotomous classifications based on single thresholds 
(such as underconfident, well-calibrated, and overconfident). Due to their complex dependency on 
measurement errors, the latter are generally difficult to interpret. This dependency on precision also 
needs to be considered when comparing studies that utilize different levels of precision.  
A general, fourth, limitation that should be noted is that the incentive compatibility of our 
mechanism as well as the interpretation of the results are based on the assumption that risk attitudes 
are independent of the source of risk (which is common in belief elicitation methods and standard in 
rank-dependent  utility  theories).  This  assumption  is  critical  for  the  inference  that  the  elicited 
confidence  reflects  the  risk  associated  with  the  participant’s  own  performance.  Empirical  work 
seems to suggest that risk attitudes differ for both sources of risk, own performance, and lotteries 
(Heath and Tversky, 1991; Kilka and Weber, 2001). Because of the fact that this limitation is very 
rather common, this issue clearly calls for more research into belief elicitation under conditions of 
source-dependent risk attitudes. 
7  CONCLUSIONS  
This  study  has  been  motivated  by  the  ongoing  discussion  about  the  appropriate 
measurement of overconfidence and, in particular, how to measure it in strictly incentive compatible 
experiments.  We  have  identified  some  major  challenges,  e.g.,  the  necessary  balance  between 30 
incentives  to  maximize  own  performance  and  the  incentives  to  predict  own  performance  as 
accurately as possible. Most recently, in this journal, Blavatskyy (2009) has suggested a mechanism 
that elicits overconfidence in an arguably incentive compatible way. This mechanism has several 
crucial advantages: it does not require the statement of probabilities, it has been empirically shown 
to be robust to variations in risk attitudes, and it balances the two incentives for confidence and 
performance  in  an  elegant  way.  While  these  characteristics  are  indeed  desirable,  we  have 
nevertheless  identified  weaknesses.  Based  on  existing  empirical  and  theoretical  studies,  we 
substantially extend and adapt Blavatskyy’s (2009) mechanism, mainly with regard to the strictness 
of  its  incentive  compatibility  and  the  identification  of  well-calibrated  participants.  Another 
significant improvement is the measurement of more than a maximum of three levels of confidence, 
i.e., overconfidence, underconfidence, and well-calibrated confidence. We finally develop and test a 
new method that retains all the advantages of Blavatskyy’s (2009) mechanism but is, in addition, 
strictly incentive compatible (theoretically shown within the framework of CPT), identifies those 
participants as well-calibrated whose confidence is closer to their actual performance than to any 
other possible performance, and is suited to measure overconfidence with much greater precision.  
Besides  this  methodological  advance,  this  paper  also  provides  more  applied  results. 
Research on relative overconfidence generally focuses on the belief to be better than the average of a 
population. We argue that for  many social and economic situations  the belief to be better than 
average is of less relevance than the belief to be the best or among the best. Since our mechanism 
elicits  degrees  of  overconfidence,  we  can  test  whether,  for  instance,  more  than  ten  percent  of 
participants believe to be better than ninety percent. In fact, our analysis (visualized in Figure 2) 
shows  that,  simultaneously,  too  few  participants  believe  to  be  among  the  best  while  too  many 
believe not to be among the worst. This may have significant economic implications, which would 
be worthwhile to investigate in more depth. For instance, a general underconfidence to be among the 
best could lead to pessimism in highly competitive environments, such as patent races, where the 
winner takes it all, possibly triggering underinvestments into research and development. 31 
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APPENDIX A: EXPERIMENT INSTRUCTIONS FOR PARTICIPANTS 
There were two versions of the instructions. Both versions differ with respect to the order of 
treatments. In the version reported below, the first set of decisions is related to own performance 
while the second set of decisions is related to own relative performance. In the second, unreported 
version, the order is reversed. 
 




You will be participating in an experiment in the economics of decision making in which 
you  can  make  money.  The  amount  of  money  you  will  receive  will  depend  on  your 
general  knowledge  and  on  your  decisions  during  the  experiment.  Irrespective  of  the 
result of the experiment, you will receive a participation fee of €2.50. 
 
Please  do  not  communicate  with  other  participants  from  now  on.  If  you  have  any 
questions, please refer to the experimenters. 
   
All decisions are made anonymously.  
 
You will now receive detailed instructions regarding the course of the experiment.  
 
It is crucial for the success of our study that you fully understand the instructions. After 
having  read  them,  you  will  therefore  have  to  answer  a  number  of  test  questions  to 
control whether you understood them correctly. The experiment will not start until all 
participants have answered the test questions.  
 
Please read the instructions carefully and do not hesitate to contact the experimenters in 
case you have any questions. 
 
Course of the experiment 
 
After all participants have read the instructions and answered the test questions, we will 
begin with the first part of the experiment. 
 
In this part, you will see a sequence of 10 questions, for each of which you will have to 
choose  1 out  of  4  possible  answers.  One  other  player  in  this  room  will be  randomly 
assigned to you and will have to solve exactly the same series of questions. 
 
In (the following) parts 2 and 3, we will offer you the opportunity to choose a payoff 
mechanism. A payoff mechanism is a method that describes how your payoff will be 
determined. In both parts, 2 and 3, you will have to choose between two Options: cards 




For this mechanism, 20 playing cards will be shuffled. A certain number of these cards 
bear a green cross. You will draw one card from the stack. If it bears a green cross, you 
will receive €7. If it does not bear a green cross, you will receive €0. By the time you 
have to decide for or against this payoff mechanism, you will know exactly how many of 




If  you  choose  this  mechanism,  your  payoff  depends  on  your  answers  to  the  quiz 
questions. The more questions you have answered correctly, the higher is your chance 
of receiving a payoff of €7. There are two variants of the payoff mechanism “quiz”: own 
result and relative result. 
 
a)  Own result: One out of the 10 quiz questions will be drawn randomly. If you 
answered this question correctly, you will receive a payoff of €7. Otherwise, you 
will  receive  €0.  With  this  payoff  mechanism,  your  payoff  will  only  depend on 
your own performance. 35 
b)  Relative result: If you answered more questions correctly than the player that 
has been assigned to you in the beginning and had to answer exactly the same 
questions, you will receive €7. If you answered fewer questions correctly, you 
will receive €0. In case of a draw, it will be randomly decided who will receive 
the €7. 
 
In the second part of the experiment, you will be able to choose between the payoff 
mechanisms 
(1)   cards and  
(2a)  quiz – own result.  
 
In  the  third  part  of  the  experiment,  you  will  be  able  to  choose  between  the  payoff 
mechanisms 
(1)   cards and  
(2b)  quiz – relative result.  
 
In both parts, one of your options will be to draw a card from a stack which might bear a 
green  cross,  which  is  a  pure  random  mechanism.  The  other  option  will  always  be  a 
payoff mechanism, which determines your payoff based on your result from answering 
the quiz questions. This means that, in any case, you should try to correctly answer as 
many questions as possible. It may happen that the number of cards with a green cross 
is always so small that may you prefer to be paid according to your answers. In this 
case, your chances are better the more questions you answered correctly. 
 
The diagram below shows the course of the experiment schematically: 
 
Part 1  Answer quiz questions 
 
(1) Cards  
 
     or  
•  One out of 20 cards is drawn 
•  Green cross: €7 
•  No green cross: €0 
Part 2  Choose a 
payoff 
mechanism  
(2a) Quiz – 
own result 
 
•  One quiz question is randomly drawn 
•  Correct answer: €7 
•  Wrong answer: €0 
(1) Cards  
 
     or  
•  One out of 20 cards is drawn 
•  Green cross: €7 
•  No green cross: €0 
Part 3  Choose a 
payoff 
mechanism 
(2b) Quiz - 
relative 
result 
•  Another player has been randomly 
assigned to you 
•  You answered more questions correctly 
than he/she: €7 
•  You answered fewer questions correctly 
than he/she: €0 
 
If you have understood the course of the experiment, you may now start to answer the 
test questions you see on your computer screen. You may always, before and during the 
experiment, refer to these instructions. The sole aim of the test questions is to control 
whether you understood the instructions. They are not the quiz questions you will see in 
part 1 of the experiment! 
 
The  experiment  will  start  when  all  participants  have  answered  the  test  questions 
correctly. 
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APPENDIX B: SCREENSHOT OF THE EXPERIMENT 
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TABLE 1 
Descriptive statistics (mean, standard deviation, mode) and selected correlations 
 
  Descriptive statistics  Correlations 
  µ µ µ µ  σ σ σ σ  median  p  c  rc 
Performance p  0.497  0.181  0.5  -  0.472  0.475 
Relative performance rp  0.500  0.441  0.5  0.551  0.491  0.388 
Confidence c  0.492  0.172  0.5  0.472  -  0.728 
Relative confidence rc  0.498  0.173  0.5  0.475  0.728  - 
Overconfidence oc  -0.005  0.182  0.00  -0.551  0.476  0.215 
Relative  overconfidence  roc 
1) 
-0.002  0.407  0.05  -0.395  -0.223  0.005 
Sample size n=60 
1) There are 30 cases with roc less than or equal to 0.00 and 30 cases greater than or equal to 0.10; thus, 0.05 
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Comparison of confidence regarding absolute performance and relative 
performance  
(including conditional means and linear regressions) 
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To improve the visibility of data points, we added some small white noise to single data points (but 
not to the data used for conditional means and regressions). 
 
 